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FOREWORD
This past April the Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. The theme,
"China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer
Competitor," was especially timely.
The following papers, presented by Dr. David Shambaugh and
Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun, look at China from two very
different perspectives. Professor Shambaugh contends that those
who succeed Deng Xiaoping, fearful of any further erosion of
Communist Party hegemony and determined to return China to a
purer form of neo-Maoist Marxism, will become even more
conservative as China's economic and social problems intensify.
Despite considerable political and economic challenges, his best
estimate is that China will, from inherent inertia, "muddle
through" well into the 21st century. Indeed, it is in the
interests of the United States for China to hold together as a
territorial nation-state and political unit because
disintegration would foster socio-economic dislocations that
could destabilize Asia. At the same time, U.S. policy must
maintain pressure on China to improve human and civil rights
performance.
Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun provides a tour d'horizon<D>
of nearly a half-century of Chinese defense policy, from a
distinctly PRC perspective. He then argues that China has
attained a position of security and, even though the world
presents many uncertainties, Beijing is committed to playing a
positive role for peace and stability in Asia. The central
principle in today's security analysis is that defense policy
must support economic development so that China can grow into an
economically progressive, democratic, and modern socialist
country. Colonel Wang portrays China's military posture as one
that seeks, above all, to protect China's territorial
sovereignty, while focusing in this relatively peaceful era on
modernizing in step with national economic development.
These two monographs provide useful, if divergent,
perspectives on a nation whose course in the early 21st century
will increasingly interact with our own in political, military,
and economic spheres.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
David Shambaugh
Introduction.
The United States is dealing with a complex and transitional
political system in China. By some measures it is a strong,
centralized, competent and decisive system. By others, it is a
decentralized, weak, fragile, and decaying system. Understanding
the nature of the transitions affecting the Chinese political
system, the system's many complexities, and its strengths and
weaknesses, is fundamental to fashioning an American strategy for
dealing with China in the years to come. How China will behave on
the world stage, whether it keeps its agreements with the United
States and other nations, and its willingness to accept and
uphold the norms and standards of international relations, all
depend in no small part on the nature and evolution of China's
political system and the officials that work in it.
This paper explores several elements of China's current
political system with an eye towards anticipating its evolution
and potential impact on Sino-American relations. Predicting this
evolution is a difficult and ultimately impossible task. If
Chinese politics have proven one thing since 1949, it is their
unpredictability. At a time of such transition in the Chinese
state and society, analysts have identified numerous potential
scenarios and variables for China's political future.1 My own
estimate is that political change in China will be incremental at
best and will very likely lurch further in the direction of harsh
authoritarianism. I do not foresee the blossoming of political
pluralism and democracy in China unless there is a fundamental
change in the regime--a possibility to which I would assign very
little chance. Rather, I foresee that:
• The ruling party and elite will continue to take a zerosum view of politics--i.e., any gain in political autonomy on
society's part is a loss for the state, and any move towards
liberalization and pluralism is a step in the direction of
increased societal pressure on the state and the ultimate
political demise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While this
is not necessarily a correct view--the CCP could likely increase
its legitimacy and longevity by relaxing its authoritarian grip
and increasing political freedoms and participation--it is the
consensus of the current ruling elite and represents a key lesson
learned from the events of 1989-91 in China and the communist
world.
• No Gorbachev-style political reformer will emerge in the
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post-Deng era. The regime will continue to be comprised of a
combination of party apparachiks, economic technocrats, military
modernizers, and political commissars--all of whom have an
interest in maintaining tight authoritarian political control and
modest economic reforms. The balance of political power among the
ruling elite will thus remain profoundly conservative and
dominated by the Soviet-trained generation now in power. This
generation and ruling elite is profoundly suspicious of the West
in general, and the United States in particular.
• Dissent and popular unrest will be dealt with harshly, and
no genuinely autonomous forms of civil society will be permitted
to develop.
• The regime and state will not be allowed to implode and
fall from power. Brute force will be used to maintain power if
necessary. The military and security services will not only
strictly police society, but will also play an increasingly
important role in elite politics. A Polish Jaruzelski-style
military/ security dominant state could well emerge if the partystate is challenged on a mass scale and proves divided or
ineffective in dealing with popular unrest.
• Intensified nationalism will remain the psychological glue
binding the state to society. This will also tend to win over
many conservative intellectuals to the regime, and further
isolate liberal intellectuals. "Neo-conservatism" (xin
baoshouzhuyi) will replace "neo-authoritarianism" (xin
quanweizhuyi) as the ethos of the intellectual elite.
• The political center (Zhongyang) in Beijing and the party
and state authorities at the provincial and local levels will
continue to work out a modus vivendi for demarcating respective
responsibilities. The parameters of such a bargain are already
taking shape in the form of the new revenue-sharing scheme and
nomenklatura appointment procedures. In essence, the quid pro quo
will entail a tradeoff of greater flexibility and leeway given to
subnational levels in economic affairs in return for strict
compliance in political affairs.
These are the main elements that I foresee in the evolution
of the Chinese political system towards the turn of the century
(any predictions beyond that are too difficult to envision). The
implications of such a political system for U.S.-China policy are
not encouraging. The very essence and nature of the Chinese
political system will be an object of American concern in and of
itself (particularly in the realm of human rights), but also
because such a political regime will likely be very reluctant to
meet American demands and cooperate on a variety of substantive
issues of deep concern to the United States. The Chinese
leadership will tend to see the United States in adversarial
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terms and vice versa. The decentralization of the economic system
and declining local compliance with central policies also
suggests that China's capacity to enforce bilateral and
international agreements will continue to decline, thus further
irritating Sino-American relations.
China as Political Pariah.
To many Americans and the Congress, the Chinese political
system is repugnant and antithetical to cherished American values
and national interests. China is seen by many as a harshly
repressive, authoritarian, communist regime that concentrates
power in the hands of a despotic few and systematically abuses
the human rights of its citizens.
This is not an incorrect image. The Chinese regime is one of
the world's worst abusers of human rights and basic freedoms. It
maintains itself in power in large part through intimidation and
coercion of the population. It tolerates no opposition. It
maintains a garrison state of nearly 3 million in the armed
forces, nearly 1 million in the paramilitary People's Armed
Police, and perhaps 50 million nationwide in the Ministry of
Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and local police. As
many as 200 million serve in local militias. All of these forces
are used more for the maintenance of internal security than
external security. These security services are the direct tools
of the ruling Communist Party and its constituent local
governments. They brook no dissent. The judiciary system is
merely a compliant arm of the security state, which prosecutes
cases swiftly and metes out harsh punishments for a wide range of
offenses. China has, by far, more capital punishment cases than
any other nation on earth (approximately 6,000 in 1995); over 60
different offenses are punishable by death under the Chinese
criminal and civil codes. China's penal system includes a vast
network of draconian labor camps--which have been brought to the
world's attention by former inmate and human rights campaigner,
Harry Hongda Wu.
China is also a country that denies its citizens fundamental
political freedoms (despite many being enshrined in the Chinese
constitution). The formation of autonomous civic or political
organizations are forbidden, thus denying the opportunity for
civil society to develop. Those that are permitted to exist are
co-opted, infiltrated, and controlled by the party-state. No
independent trade unions are allowed. No legitimate forms of
political petition or protest are permitted. Nor are competitive
parties and elections permitted to exist; the so-called
"democratic parties" that operate under the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) are a sham. To be sure,
there has been a greater measure of choice in the selection of
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local government officials and delegates to local and provincial
people's congresses in recent years, but there is no doubt that
any individual who transgresses Communist Party dictates,
discipline, and norms will be removed from office. Freedom of
speech and assembly is severely restricted--if not denied.
Freedom of religion is also constricted, and a variety of
religious practitioners are persecuted. Public expressions of
political opposition are absolutely not tolerated, and will
result in a lengthy sentence for "counter-revolutionary
behavior." The media in China remain tightly controlled by the
Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, and international
media are also censored and restricted in their domestic
distribution. Foreign journalists in China cannot leave the
capital without permission and being accompanied by security
monitors. While in Beijing, tailing and harassment by State
Security agents is de riguer, as is telephone tapping, mail
opening, and general surveillance. Other foreigners resident in
China are subjected to similar forms of restriction and
monitoring.
Let us not deceive ourselves--China's political system
remains authoritarian and repressive. In fact, it has become
significantly more so in recent years. Many features are
antithetical to many core American values and those enshrined in
the U.N. Covenant on Human Rights and other international
agreements. Thus there is an empirical basis for the image of the
Chinese political system as one that denies and abuses
fundamental human and political rights, and operates a virtual
police state. Under any set of criteria, it is difficult not to
judge such a political system as inimical to American values and
interests.
As the subject of this conference is to forecast whether
China will become a "strategic partner" or "peer competitor" of
the United States, I would submit that--in the political realm-China is neither partner or competitor, but is rather a pariah
and an adversary. The United States and the international
community cannot sit idly by and ignore such gross violations of
basic human rights. It must both publicize and penalize China's
transgressions, while working with Chinese authorities where
possible to promote humane governance. Whether this state of
affairs will continue into the future depends entirely upon
whether the Chinese leadership returns to the path of increased
tolerance, openness, pluralism, and political reform embarked
upon during the 1980s under Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. As noted
above, I rate the chances of such a change in the near term (3-5
years) as slim to nonexistent.
Such a pervasive negative image obscures the fact that the
Chinese government also meets many basic human needs of its
citizens and has done much to alleviate poverty, develop the
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economy and raise the standard of living of the populace. It has
also removed many of the more draconian features of the Maoist
era and opened China to a wide range of cultural pursuits. The
difference between China in 1976 and 1996 could not be more
stark. There is much that has improved for Chinese citizens.
China's Political Fragility.
The image of China's political system presented above
provides the sense that the regime is strong and in control. In
some respects it is--but this image belies, I believe, a more
fundamentally fragile and weak political system. On the surface
it seems a strong and stable system--effectively governing 1.2
billion people, modernizing rapidly, attaining great power
status, and beginning to flex its muscles on the world stage. But
this image is deceiving.
There are many indicators of severe social and systemic
weaknesses that the regime will be hard-pressed to cope with in
the years to come. Corruption is rampant on a national scale, and
is both corroding society and a cancer on the state. Politburo
member and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong was toppled from power in
1995 on corruption charges, while 18 of his associates were
indicted for allegedly embezzling $2.2 billion. Crimes of various
sorts are rising rapidly. Drug use is increasing, as is
prostitution. Secret societies and criminal triads operate
nationally. Alienation is rampant among youth, and material
hedonism permeates society. Intellectuals are a distraught lot.
Respect for political authority has waned, and communist ideology
is discredited. Compliance with political directives is usually
feigned or often ignored. Local urban governments must cope with
a huge migrant population on top of "normal" population increases
that add more than 20 million per annum. Many of the old organs
of the Leninist state--the propaganda, organization, united front
departments--have atrophied. Recruitment into the Communist
Party has fallen off, and in many cases new recruits must now be
bribed by the Party to enter. In any event, they no longer see
party membership as entree into the elite--nor as a guaranteed
avenue of upward mobility. For many, party membership simply
decreases the chances of harassment by the party-state and
security authorities. It also means better access to guanxi
(connections) that can be used in business or to get a passport
and go abroad. Another sign of declining Party control is the
more restricted impact of the nomenklatura system, whereby the
"one-level-down" appointment system is now the national norm.
In brief, China is becoming an increasingly anarchic
society. The general decline in state authority and moral
community is the root of the problem, but the erosion of the
public security system outside the capital, the opportunities for
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graft, rising social tensions, and increased access to weapons
all have contributed.2 China's social fabric is fraying. Even the
nuclear family is fracturing--divorces increased nearly 100
percent between 1984 and 1994.
When considering this social decay in the context of China's
political system, one has the sense of the proverbial emperor
without clothes: a naked state stripped of its traditional
sources of legitimacy and sources of rule; a state increasingly
dependent on coercive methods of rule, corruption, and striking
deals with local power barons to stay in power. In traditional
Chinese political philosophy, such a state lacks moral authority
(de) and, hence, legitimacy. A legitimate Chinese state is
benevolent (wangdao), while an illegitimate state is coercive
(badao). The analogy of the current Chinese Communist regime to
moribund imperial dynasties is clear to many.
Does this mean it will implode or collapse? It is not
likely. Many Chinese dynasties endured in despotic states for
several generations, and many nations "muddle through" with
problems far more severe than China. Indeed, one could easily
identify countless structural weaknesses in the United States--a
crippling national debt that periodically shuts down the national
government, laggard economic growth, decayed inner cities,
widespread drug use, racial and ethnic tensions, a society
alienated from political life, political leaders who are at
loggerheads and fail to inspire the citizenry, rising terrorism-but the United States is not about to collapse. (Although quite a
few of China's America watchers have predicted it!)
The expectation that the Chinese party-state will continue
to muddle through should not obscure an analysis of the existing
weaknesses and potential challenges to the regime and system. It
is a political system with weak institutions and atrophied
mechanisms of control within the context of hegemonic rule. The
ruling elite are undergoing wholesale generational turnover and a
political succession. The new elite is a conglomerate of
apparachik-technocrats who, thus far, pursue incrementalist
policies intended to preserve their power and maintain social
order above all. They continue to reform the economic system, but
show few signs of making concomitant changes to the political
system. The Chinese Communist Party is a ruling party riddled
with corruption, drawing upon shrinking sources of legitimacy,
and maintaining its rule through coercive power and appeals to
strident nationalism. If China suffers a downturn in the economy
and living standards begin to stagnate (which is already
occurring in many regions and among some classes), the most
positive tool in the regime's arsenal would disappear.
Thus, while weak, I do not think that China's political
system is about to collapse or imminently implode. Decay is a
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gradual process--the instruments of statecraft progressively
corrode, but it takes time. China's political system is still far
from being impotent. Unlike its neighbor, North Korea, China's
political system is capable of performing certain social
responsibilities of state, delivering remarkable economic growth,
and protecting national security. These are not signs of a system
on the verge of collapse. Yet, they should not mask underlying
systemic weaknesses in the system and the profound challenges
facing it in the future.
While China's leaders today are confronted with systemic
weaknesses and an array of domestic problems, it can be argued
that many problems have subsided compared with a year ago, and
that the leadership's position has somewhat stabilized as a
result. The growth and inflation rates have come down to
manageable levels, leading some economists to conclude that China
has managed the "soft landing" desired. The leadership succession
seems more stable than it did a year ago, and China's foreign
relations show strength in many cases.
On this basis, some China specialists find cause for
cautious optimism--when only 6 months or a year ago, many
prognoses were pessimistic. But if China-watching has proven one
truism, it is not to overemphasize the peaks or the troughs in
China's evolution. While detailing the problems and challenges
that confront the Chinese party-state, they must at the same time
be placed in comparative context.
Placing China's Problems in Context.
China's leaders are not the only ruling elites in the world
who fail to inspire their citizenry and face problems of
political succession, and the Chinese Communist Party is hardly
the only political party in Asia or the world that suffers a
crisis of confidence. Alienation runs deep in the body politic of
many nations. The leaders of Great Britain, America, Germany,
Israel, and Russia are fighting for their political lives. The
Japanese and Italian governments seem in a perpetual state of
flux. India and South Korea are prosecuting unprecedentedly highlevel corruption cases, while North Korea is on the verge of
collapse. By comparison, China's leadership appears remarkably
stable, and the Chinese Communist Party has shown endurance not
demonstrated by its erstwhile comrades elsewhere in the shrunken
socialist world.
China's social problems are generally well-managed when
compared with other developing countries. China has a rapidly
rising crime rate and growing problem with narcotics production
and consumption, but it pales on an international basis. China
has rampant corruption, but what developing country does not?
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China has problems of truancy, delinquency, illiteracy, and
domestic violence, but these are all international problems
associated with developed and modernizing societies. By the
measures of many developing nations, China has demonstrated basic
social stability and remarkable poverty alleviation, the ability
to feed and deliver essential social services to the population,
and a capacity for unparalleled economic growth.
Many of China's economic problems are shared by other
transitional economies or are not as critical as elsewhere.
China's difficulties of containing unemployment and social unrest
while overhauling a laggard state industrial sector are shared by
Germany and all the nations of the former socialist bloc. Its
inflation rate (12 percent in 1995) is minuscule compared to the
rates witnessed in certain Latin American, Middle Eastern, and
Asian countries in recent years. A ballooning national budget
deficit to approximately $11 billion is unheard of in China, but
would be welcome in the debt-plagued United States or Latin
American states. China's foreign exchange reserves continue to
mount (currently $70 billion), its foreign trade shows a
substantial surplus in its favor, and foreign investment
continues to pour into the country at unprecedented levels.
Externally, for the first time in 150 years, China has no
pressing threat to its national security, and has managed to
pacify its borders and normalize relations with all of its
neighbors.
There are thus reasons not to overemphasize the myriad
difficulties and problems encountered in its transition to a
market economy. The magnitude of economic reforms undertaken in
China over the last 15 years deserve much acclaim. They have
produced the most rapid and dramatic economic transformation in
as short a period of time as the world has ever known, with
surprisingly little socio-political disruption. More than 200
million peasants have been moved off the land, out of
agriculture, and into light industrial manufacturing. As a result
of the growth of township and village enterprises (TVEs), China
has become a major trading nation, and its manufactured exports
flood world consumer markets. The socialist commune system in
agriculture has been dismantled, with the result that annual
grain production has increased by a quarter to an average annual
yield of 435 million metric tons. (Whether this amount is
sufficient to feed a population growing by approximately 20
million per year is another question.) The national economy has
grown at an average of nearly 10 percent over the past 15 years,
while wage increases have generally been able to keep pace with
inflation. The service sector, nascent only a decade ago, now
accounts for almost one-third of the country's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). The private and collective sectors of the economy
have grown most dramatically, now accounting for roughly half of
GDP. Chinese science and technology have made great strides, as
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has its military modernization program.
The success of China's reforms are consequently receiving
close study by the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe,
the former Soviet Union, and Asia. The "shock therapy" approach
to economic transition from socialist to market economies (as
advocated by the International Monetary Fund and Harvard
economist Jeffrey Sachs) has produced mixed results--with Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic enjoying softer landings and
easier transitions than Bulgaria, the former East Germany, the
Baltic states, and the former Soviet Union. As a result, China's
more gradualist approach to introducing reforms has attracted
increasing attention from economic planners and specialists in
these countries and abroad.3
The Political Implications of China's Socio-Economic Problems.
Notwithstanding the context and balanced perspective called
for above, an assessment of China's political stability must take
into account the multiple social and economic problems existing
in the country. Politics cannot be isolated from a nation's
society and economy; indeed, as Marx aptly noted, the former
reflects the latter.
While China seems relatively stable at present, it remains a
volatile and unstable country that could suffer social and
political turmoil at any time. Episodic outbreaks of unrest in
cities and countryside provide the sense that social frustrations
run deep and could easily erupt. Industrial action is on the
rise, while rural riots have returned after a 2-year hiatus.
Inflation and widespread corruption, taken together with labor
mobility and rural unemployment, could trigger mass
demonstrations again as in 1989. Widening income disparities is
also a potential catalyst. The declining incentives to engage in
farming--rising cost of inputs, inadequate procurement prices,
IOUs paid for contracted grain, shrinking arable land--and better
opportunities in the commercial sector have all stimulated
countless cases of rural unrest and confrontation with local
authorities. The government's plans to restructure state
industrial enterprises, which will inevitably result in
widespread urban unemployment, will fuel urban discontent. Lossmaking state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have already endured
several years of sporadic industrial action (by some accounts
more than 10,000 incidents in 19944). The government has thus far
put off the restructuring program of SOEs for fear of the
resulting dislocations and demonstrations, but the price paid has
been a ballooning budget deficit resulting from the rising
subsidies needed to keep the socialist behemoths afloat. The
subsidies, in turn, have impinged upon the tight monetary policy
needed to stem inflation and rationalize the chaotic banking
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system.
Nearly two-thirds of China's 12,000 large and medium-sized
state industries lose money, yet they employ approximately 45
million workers and account for more than 50 percent of China's
national industrial output. It is estimated that 70 percent of
factories are unable to meet salaries on a regular basis.5
Keeping them afloat is causing severe budgetary strains on state
coffers. In May 1995 the government announced that the SOEs had
total assets of $300 billion, but that they were also saddled
with a $200 billion debt.6 Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated
their intention to bite the bullet and restructure the SOEs, but
each time they have backed away. In 1995 the government finally
moved from intention to specifics, and proclaimed that 1996 would
be the year in which restructuring begins. Under the planned
reform, several initiatives would be taken. The restructuring
would not be undertaken wholesale, but rather incrementally--so
as to assess progress and stagger the impact. Over a 5-year
period, those firms with the worst losses would be declared
bankrupt, but those that show improvement would be incorporated
and amalgamated with existing collective enterprises (thus
creating vertically-integrated zaibatsu-style conglomerates along
the Japanese model), or auctioned off to foreign concerns. The
bank debts of those that are to be turned into corporations would
be written off and new shares created, backed by government
bonds. The enterprises' housing, hospitals, clinics, schools, and
other affiliated institutions (the major source of subsidies)
would be absorbed by the central and provincial governments. A
social security system is to be readied to compensate redundant
workers. It is questionable whether these plans will work, but,
if they are phased-in, the worst dislocations could be avoided.
Thus, on balance, the Chinese economy remains in a half-way
house between plan and market, with significant distortions left
over from the socialist command economy plaguing further
development. Proceeding with further market reforms will
inevitably accentuate social dislocations and bring pressure to
bear on the political system. It is likely that local governments
will have to bear the brunt of both meeting and repressing social
demands. Given the complex and intertwined environment in which
local governments and local enterprises operate,7 these demands
will place local governments in very awkward situations. On the
one hand, they will be put into the position of having to
subsidize local industries without adequate capital allocated
from the central banking system. They will also potentially have
to absorb large numbers of unemployed without adequate
infrastructure, housing, or social services. On the other hand,
if demonstrations erupt, local governments will be the first
"decision point" to deploy People's Armed Police riot control
troops. Such locally- garrisoned troops are generally far less
competent or well-equipped for such circumstances.
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While social instability is to be expected in a country the
size of China and one that has experienced such dramatic
economic change, the stresses and strains in society and on the
political system have never been greater. Pent-up demands are not
being met. Nor are they given avenues for interest aggregation
and articulation, thus compounding social frustrations. China is
following the well-worn path of other developing countries,
whereby, after reaching a certain level of economic development
and consumer satisfaction, citizens begin to desire improved
social services and public policies. If the political channels
for articulating these demands--or to aggregate these interests
via civic and political non-governmental organizations (NGOs)-are unavailable or closed off by the state, the experience of
many developing countries has been expression of political
demands through political protest. The weak institutionalization
of the Chinese political system in terms of expressing political
demands and fashioning responsive public policies is a chronic
weakness in the system at present and will only become more so
over time.
China's Current Political Situation.
China faces a series of political challenges in the year
ahead, not the least of which are the various political
implications of managing the social dislocations caused by the
economic reform policies outlined above. Providing social welfare
for over 100 million unemployed; maintaining grain stocks and
feeding China's 1.2 billion people; stemming the tide of internal
migration of between 100-150 million people; bridging the growing
income gaps within and between provinces; and satisfying public
demands for improved housing, education, and environment will all
top the government's agenda. All are difficult feats to
accomplish.
In the coming years China's political problems will largely
be those common to development--but on a magnified scale. In this
regard, China's leaders confront challenges not unlike India,
Indonesia, and other large developing countries. The key will be
the degree to which the political system fashions public and
private institutions that are responsive to public demands. This
will inevitably require a political loosening to permit the
development of civil society and NGOs--something the Communist
Party has thus far feared and refused to permit. It will also
necessitate more accountable government institutions. With the
current level of corruption in China, the Communist Party and
government already face a severe crisis of legitimacy. But if
government institutions at all levels fail to meet growing
demands for social services, tensions will only galvanize and the
regime's legitimacy will be further undermined. Given the
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Communist Party's zero-sum view of political power and its
leaders' morbid fear of enfranchising other institutional bases
of political mobilization, prognoses for institutional reform are
not good. This, in turn, underlies the fragility of the current
regime and political system.
China's creaking political system will probably "muddle
through" in the near term, but fundamental structural adjustments
are needed. In the immediate future, of course, China's
leadership faces the prospect of political succession to Deng
Xiaoping. It is not certain that Deng will die in 1996, but his
frail condition and one public appearance in 3 years has sparked
much speculation about his condition and the arrangements for his
succession. Deng is thought to be suffering from a variety of
ailments--including pancreatic cancer, diabetes, chronic hearing
loss, and rheumatism.
Deng has arranged his succession as best possible. At the
14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1992, Deng made a
last effort to overhaul the leadership, removing his opponents
and installing a new cohort. Jiang Zemin was confirmed in the
three top positions of state president, chairman of the Central
Military Commission, and general-secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party. Subsequently Jiang Zemin has consolidated his
grip on power, particularly in the armed forces. In September
1995 Jiang shook up the Central Military Commission, bringing
those loyal to him into the elite body. This shakeup of the High
Command follows 2 years of personnel changes throughout military
apparat at lower levels. Jiang's hand has also been visible in
promoting many former proteges from Shanghai to the inner-circle
of the Politburo and putting his men in charge of key Central
Committee departments. Jiang has also made his mark on the world
stage, and has generally been well received abroad. Premier Li
Peng, the Soviet technocrat and political hardliner, remains No.
2 in the hierarchy. He is not well liked at home or aboard, but
has proven adept at managing the economy and building up a loyal
network of supporters in State Council ministries. Qiao Shi,
Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the man in
charge of the internal security services, remains an enigmatic
figure. He has breathed some new life into the NPC and has
emerged from the shadows of security work to be a more visible
leader at home and abroad in recent years. Vice-Premier Zhu
Rongji has helped restructure the economy, but has made many
political enemies in the process. Zhu is vulnerable in any
succession struggle, although he is being mentioned as the
leading candidate to succeed Li Peng as Premier when the latter's
term expires in 1997 (Wu Bangguo, Luo Gan, and Li Lanqing are the
other leading contenders). Hu Jintao, the youngest member of the
leadership, was elevated to the Standing Committee of the
Politburo and given the propaganda and ideology portfolio in
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1992, while Li Ruihuan remains a peripheral member of the ruling
elite.
These are the prime players among active politicians in the
succession. Each has strengths and weaknesses in their bases of
power, but they have an intrinsic interest in hanging together.
However, as in other Communist systems, numerous retired and
second echelon leaders wield important power and influence. My
sense is that Jiang Zemin's status as primes inter pares is
secure at present. If he does not play his hand carefully, he
could be toppled, but, for the time being, his position seems
secure. Jiang's links to the PLA are particularly crucial, and
these too seem fairly solid at present. Jiang is vulnerable,
however, for promoting many of his Shanghai cronies to the
Politburo and top jobs in Beijing. But if he had not done so,
critics would be accusing him of not building his power base. If
Jiang has rivals, they would seem to be Li Peng and Yang
Shangkun. The 87-year-old Yang particularly has scores to settle
with Jiang and retains considerable influence in the armed
forces, while Li Peng has a strong following in both the Party
and State Council and has a good track record on managing
economic affairs. Both will be carefully watching for Jiang to
slip, and will "keep their powder dry" for a showdown.
Thus Deng's arrangements for the succession seem to have
taken root. Indeed, there is no real reason to expect midnight
arrests, purges, or other overt factional struggles following the
patriarch's demise. The leadership remains essentially united and
collectivist--a marked departure from years past. Nonetheless,
occasionally Deng's reform policies come under attack from
remnants of what one may describe as neo-Maoism: those who fear
the erosion of Communist Party hegemony, cultural and ideological
contamination by Western "bourgeois" influences, and the
usurpation of core communist values. Their threat to Deng's
arrangements is not great, but it does point up the fact that
such elements still exist among the Chinese elite, and they can
marshall some influence and work to undermine further reforms.
While Deng's succession arrangements seem well-laid, it must
be recognized that Communist party-states have a notoriously bad
track record of arranging smooth successions. No doubt the
leadership is not as united as it seems, and key cleavages do
exist. But they should not be exaggerated either. The military
High Command will be a crucial--even decisive--player and arbiter
and has a strong interest in ensuring a smooth succession and
social stability. It also has a corporate interest in maintaining
the Communist Party civilians in power, but individuals who are
supportive of the PLA's wishes and demands.
Just because the elite appears relatively united does not
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mean that the system is stable. Far from it. The entire system of
Communist Party rule in China remains fragile and vulnerable.
When considering post-Deng scenarios, internal upheaval and
fundamental challenges to the system should not be ruled out.
Recognizing the vulnerability of the system is not to overlook
the Party's remaining sources of power--not the least of which is
the military and the capability to maintain power through armed
force if necessary. In the near term, China will not likely
implode or collapse, but will rather continue to "muddle through"
with more of the same: high growth, moderate inflation, growing
corruption, increasing crime and social instability, sporadic
dissidence and demonstrations, and attempts by the authorities to
maintain social and political control.
Implications for the United States.
The above analysis of China's political system and situation
suggests ten implications for the United States:
1. The U.S. capacity for inducing political change in China
is limited in a direct sense, although contributing to policies
that foster economic reform and openness is the best long-term
assurance of exerting pressures for fundamental political change.
2. The United States should persistently address, through
diplomatic channels, Chinese political trans- gressions and
particularly flagrant abuses of human, religious, civic, and
political rights. When necessary, it should speak out and
publicly criticize such transgressions. It must also, whenever
possible, work with its European and Asian partners and
international organizations in making such representations.
3. The United States must deal with the existing leaders in
China. Recognizing that the leadership is undergoing an elite
succession in which the outcome is not predictable, it is not in
American interests to align closely with a single individual or
faction. The United States should stress its interests in humane
and responsible policies, not individuals. The United States has
a national interest in a stable, developing, and humanely
governed China.
4. Given the potential for social and political unrest in
China, the United States is well-advised not to assume the status
quo--although it is the most likely scenario at present. The U.S.
Government must carefully monitor events in China, and prepare
for a range of contingences--including the potential for more
lethal force against civilians by state security agencies.
5. The United States should encourage the civilian control
of the military in China. It is not in U.S. interests for the PLA
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to seize political power, as it would undoubtedly be more
repressive internally and assertive externally. At the same time,
it is imperative to expand and deepen direct contacts with the
Chinese military establishment on a variety of levels.
6. It is in the interest of the United States for China to
hold together as a territorial nation-state and political unit.
The disintegration of China would result in widespread social
dislocations, a potentially unprecedented refugee exodus, and
destabilized Asian security.
7. It is in U.S. interests for China to build political
institutions capable of addressing multiple social and public
policy issues confronting its populace. This need is pressing.
8. It is in U.S. interests to encourage political reform,
legal reform, liberalization, and openness in China. Whether the
regime likes it or not, China is becoming socially and
economically more pluralistic--the political and legal systems
need to accommodate and reflect these changes.
9. It is in U.S. interests to build direct ties with
provincial and sub-provincial politicians and governments.
Multiple benefits will accrue, including, hopefully, better
subnational compliance with international agreements. It is also
in U.S. interests to dramatically increase the contact between
the Congress and Chinese politicians at various levels.
10. The United States should contribute, where possible, to
enhancing civil society and non-governmental organizations in
China.
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THE CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT OF
CHINA'S PERIPHERAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
AND ITS DEFENSE POLICY
Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun
The founding of the People's Republic of China was a great
turn in Chinese history. Since then, China brought to an end the
several thousand-year reign of the exploiting class and removed
the long term semi-feudal and semi- colonial state of suffering
from the imperialists' aggression and enslavement; and it came
into a new era of peaceful development as a people's democratic
and socialist republic.
The Peripheral Security Environment of China and Its Defense
Policy During the Cold War Era.
The Chinese people, who suffered from the disaster of more
than 100 years of war and the humiliation from the enemy's
aggression, thirst for peace and also know the value of state
sovereignty. After the founding of the New China, the Chinese
government and Chinese people hoped to rebuild the wounded
homeland in a peaceful external environment, but because the
United States and the Soviet Union posed a military threat to
China at different times, and even simultaneously, during more
than three decades following 1949, China had to devote
substantial resources to prepare for a large-scale defensive war
against a possible invasion from either superpower.
1950s. During the 1950s, because the U.S. Government pursued
a hostile policy of encirclement and isolation against China, the
main point of China's defense policy was to join in alliance with
the Soviet Union to oppose the U.S. policy of containment.
During World War II, China and America were allies fighting
against Japanese aggression. There were useful exchanges between
the government of the liberated areas led by the Chinese
Communist Party and the American Government. U.S. President
Roosevelt, who was both far-sighted and pragmatic, sent a group
of American military observers to Yanan, where the Central
Committee of Communist Party was located. Differences in ideology
did not stand in the way of their cooperation. Many reports were
filed by members of the group, American diplomats, and reporters,
giving truthful accounts of the democratic life in the liberated
areas and communist-established base areas behind enemy lines.
Both these Americans and General Stilwell, Commander of the
China-Burma-India theater of operations, believed that the
communist-led resistance forces constituted the main fighting
force against Japanese aggression. They called on the U.S.
Government to assist and coordinate with these forces in the
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common war effort. They were also opposed to giving assistance
only to the Kuomintang (KMT) government for fear that the United
States would be dragged into an unpopular and anti-communist
civil war. Many U.S. Government officials, dismayed by the
widespread corruption in the KMT government, viewed the Chinese
Communist Party as a force of progress in China and called for
the establishment of ties with it. Regrettably, with the onset of
the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union,
America's China policy became increasingly subjected to
ideological influence. As the Anti-Japanese War came to an end,
the United States turned to support the KMT government in its
launching of a civil war by providing it with money, weapons, and
military advisors. However, the U.S. government's support of the
KMT ended in failure as the KMT government was overthrown by the
Chinese people. The People's Republic of China was founded in
1949.
By 1949, the downfall of the KMT government was imminent.
Mr. Huang Hua, then the head of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) foreign affairs office in Nanjing and the Secretary of
China's Foreign Ministry in the late 1970s, made numerous
contacts with then U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who
still remained in Nanjing. Hua passed the message that Stuart was
welcome to visit Beijing and that he would be received by Zhou
Enlai during such a trip, thus indicating that New China was
ready to enter into good relations with the United States.
Unfortunately, the U.S. State Department quickly recalled Stuart.
On June 25, 1950, the Korean civil war broke out. Only 24
hours later, U.S. President Truman sent troops to the war,
ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Straits and
the U.S. 13th Air Force to set up base on Taiwan to prevent the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) from liberating Taiwan Island, and
supported the French Army's aggression in Vietnam. So, obviously,
the United States constituted the main and realistic military
threat to New China from three directions: the Korean Peninsula,
the Taiwan Straits, and Vietnam.
On September 15, 1950, the U.S. troops landed on Inchon,
Korean Peninsula. On September 28, they occupied Seoul, and,
regardless of the last diplomatic efforts of the Chinese
government, they crossed the 38th parallel and marched almost to
the Yalu River, the boundary of China and Korea. Under such
serious circumstances, China had to organize the Chinese People's
Volunteers to cross the Yalu River on October 19 and fight
against the U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula for nearly 3
years. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.
After the Korean War, the Chinese government hoped that
America would draw a lesson from the war and adopt an attitude of
equality toward China. China took an active diplomatic policy of
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trying to pursue dialogue with the American government. But the
United States continued pursuing its policy that isolated,
blocked, and encircled China. It threatened the peace and
security of the new Republic and made China's economic
development very difficult. So China had to adopt the one-sided
foreign policy of entering into an alliance with the Soviet Union
and made efforts to break the U.S. policy of blocking and
encircling China. In fact, during this period, besides the direct
military confrontation between their armies, China and the United
States were indirectly in confrontation over the Taiwan Straits
and in the region of Indochina.
1960s. During the 1960s, China faced a military threat
simultaneously posed by two superpowers: the United States and
the Soviet Union. The geographical focus of China's defense
policy began to gradually shift from an East-only orientation to
one split between the East and the North.
The peripheral security circumstances of China became more
serious during the 1960s. First, the good relationship between
China and the Soviet Union ended. Beginning in 1964, the Soviet
Union began sending reinforcements to the boundary separating
China and the Soviet Union, and China and Mongolia. This provoked
numerous incidents. First, Northern China sustained increasing
military pressure from the Soviet Union. Second, the United
States started an undeclared "special" war in Vietnam in 1961 and
made a surprise bombardment on the northern part of Vietnam in
August of 1964. It broadened the Indochina war and threatened
China from the south. Third, the Indian government adopted a
hostile policy toward China, with the support of the Soviet
Union, and the Indian troops continuously operated in the border
area and even invaded China's territory. Fourth, the Kuomintang
authorities on Taiwan also stepped up harassing attacks against
the southeast coastal area of mainland China.
The divergence between China and the Soviet Union began from
the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party in 1956. In
1958, the Soviet Union wanted to set up a united naval fleet with
China in order to control China's military, but China refused. In
June 1959, the Soviet Union unilaterally tore up the New National
Defense Technical Agreement between China and the Soviet Union,
and later recalled all Soviet experts and specialists from China.
After 1964, the Soviet government began to increase its troops
along the boundary of China and the Soviet Union, and China and
Mongolia from about 10 divisions to 54 divisions; it also
deployed a growing number of offensive weapons and continuously
conducted military maneuvers aimed at China. In March 1969,
Soviet forces invaded Chinese territory at Zhen Bao Island along
the eastern part of the border. The Chinese frontier troops
mounted a counterattack in self-defense and drove all the Soviet
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aggressors back. Facing increasingly great military pressure and
an aggressive threat, China had to strengthen its defense forces
in northern China.
At the same time, China gave full support to Vietnam for
opposing the American aggression. From 1965 to the end of 1968,
China sent supporting troops, including air-defense, engineering,
railway-building, mine-sweeping, logistics, and shipping
personnel to Vietnam. During the entire Vietnam War, the Chinese
government gave the Vietnam People's Army a substantial amount of
military weapons, equipment, and other supplies. The total value
added up to $20 billion U.S. dollars.
Along the southwest border, because the Indian Army
continuously encroached on and invaded Chinese territory, China's
frontier force counterattacked from October to November 1962 and
achieved success. In the southeast area, the PLA defeated the
Kuomintang's harassing attack from the land, the sea, and the
air. The PLA also waged an anti-aircraft struggle and shot down
U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft which invaded China's
airspace, to safeguard the security and economic construction of
the Chinese people.
1970s. During this decade, Sino-U.S. relations began to
improve and at last became normalized. Meanwhile, the Soviet
Union continued to build up its military forces along the border
between the Soviet Union and China. As a result, China's defense
policy emphasized preparations for an overall defensive war
against a possible surprise attack from the Soviet Union.
Toward the end of the 1960s, relations between China
and America began to change. Because of the relative decline of
the United States, the bankruptcy of the policy that the American
government pursued to isolate and encircle China for two decades,
and the strong challenge of the expanded military power of the
Soviet Union, the U.S. Government had to adjust its global
strategy. It decided to reduce its forces in Asia and wanted to
improve relations with China. When U.S. President Richard Nixon
indicated his desire to talk with the Chinese leader, the Chinese
government responded immediately. After Henry Kissinger, Nixon's
special envoy, secretly visited China in 1971, President Nixon
himself visited China during February 20-28, 1972. He seriously
and frankly exchanged opinions about the issues in China-U.S.
relations with then Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.
During this visit, the Chinese and American governments issued
the Shanghai Joint Communique, and both sides hoped for the
normalization of relations between the two countries. China and
the United States formally established diplomatic relations in
January 1979. Also, the United States signed an agreement in
Paris in January 1973 to end the Vietnam War and resume the peace
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in Vietnam, agreeing to withdraw all its troops and dismantle its
military bases in South Vietnam. The American threat to China's
security diminished significantly.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union went on pursuing the
policy of political pressure and military threat toward China,
keeping about one million troops in the border area of China and
the Soviet Union and Mongolia, and continuously strengthening its
Pacific Fleet. It established a military base in Vietnam, and
encouraged Vietnam to invade and occupy Cambodia. Even further,
the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979, and
stationed troops at the border of China and Afghanistan. So the
Soviet Union constituted the main and real threat to China from
the North, the South, and the West.
China and the Soviet Union shared a border 7,000 kilometers
long; adding the border of Mongolia, the total length of shared
border was 12,000 kilometers. It was very possible for the Soviet
Union to concentrate forces in advance, and to carry out a
surprise strategic attack against China from different
directions. The Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Union could press
toward the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea directly from the
Sea of Japan and blockade or land troops in China. So China kept
on strengthening the defense of the northern frontier and sped up
preparation for a defensive war against the Soviet Union. During
this period, Mao Zedong, the Chinese leader, put forward the
strategic thinking of "One Front," which was to organize an
international united front running from Japan, through China,
Pakistan, Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe to America in order
to counter the expansion of the Soviet Union and to prevent the
outbreak of world war.
The Strategic Shift in China's Defense Policy in the 1980s.
1980s. China made an assessment that even though the
competition between the United States and the USSR was fierce,
the world situation on the whole would move toward relaxation.
Thus, China made a strategic change in its defense policy from
the guiding principle of preparation for an early and large-scale
defensive war, to one based on the gradual modernization of the
country's defense in a relatively peaceful era.
In the late 1970s, China reassessed the world situation and
the trend of development at that time and held that a world war
was not likely to occur and that peace and development are the
top priorities on the agenda of the world. Then it put forward
the general state strategy of making economic development the
central task. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China decided in December
1978 to shift the focus of the work of the whole country onto
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economic development in three strategic stages. The first stage
was to double the gross national product (GNP) of 1980 by 1990
and to solve the problem of food and clothing for the people. The
second stage was to quadruple the GNP of 1980 by the end of this
century, thus reaching a higher level for the people's
livelihood. The third stage was to reach the level of mediumdeveloped countries in terms of per capita GNP by the middle of
the next century, thus enabling the people to enjoy a relatively
well-to-do life. After that, China will continue going forward to
develop the country into a more wealthy, democratic, civilized,
and modern society.
With the shift in the focus of the work of the state, the
guiding principles of China's defense and armed forces
development have also started to make a strategic change. In the
enlarged session of the Central Military Commission held in May
1985, Deng Xiaoping, then-Chairman of the Central Military
Commission, pointed out that, under the new historical
conditions, it was imperative to make a correct assessment of the
world situation and resolutely shift the guiding principles for
defense and armed forces development. To sum it up in one
sentence, it was aimed at changing a guiding principle which had
long been based on preparations for an early and large-scale
nuclear war to one that is based on development in a peaceful
era.
This decision was based mainly on three considerations.
First, concerning the analysis of the then-international
situation, China's assessment was that even though the
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was
fierce, and on the surface the East-West contradictions,
particularly with respect to the INF struggle, were becoming
acute, the tension would not continue. The world situation would
move toward relaxation, and the possibilities of a new world war
or direct military confrontation between the two superpowers
would be reduced. It was based on such assessment that China
foresaw the approach of a long-term peaceful environment which
would render it unnecessary to mobilize the entire population to
resist a foreign invasion.
Second, China acquired a deeper understanding of the
importance of economic security within state security. It
realized that, without economic development, there would be no
final guarantee for state security. And therefore, the meeting of
the Central Military Commission reconfirmed a decision taken by
the government in 1978 to take economic development as the
overriding target for the whole nation, and that defense
development must serve the need of economic development. The
readjustment of the guiding principles of the defense policy is
reflected in the military field.
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Third, in line with readjusting the guiding principles of
the defense policy is the need of building a modern and regular
army. In view of the above-mentioned two points, it is not only
necessary but also possible for the armed forces to do some
concrete work to develop national defense by proceeding from the
long-term mission of the army instead of taking temporary and
expedient measures to meet the immediate threat.
To effect the strategic change in the guiding principles of
defense policy, the Chinese government and its armed forces
adopted the following measures:

The demobilization of the People's Liberation Army. On
October 6, 1985, China's Xinhua News Agency reported that China
had decided to reduce the its military by one million personnel.
In the ensuing 2 years, a number of corps, divisions, and
regiments which were constructed in war time, earning numerous
war merits and great fame, were inactivated (together with their
designations), helping to reduce the total figure of the PLA from
4 million to 3 million. This unilateral disarmament before the
end of the Cold War indicated that China is willing to make
contributions to world peace and has done so with its own
concrete actions.
Streamlining and Restructuring. All the similar staff
departments and overlapping institutions at the level of General
Headquarters were disestablished or incorporated, and the rating
of some units was downgraded. The number of Military Area
Commands (MAC) was cut from 11 to 7. Some academies in the Army,
Navy, and Air Force were closed or incorporated. A number of
combined army groups were newly established. Some troops for
civil guard duties were handed over to the control of the civil
security departments and were renamed as People's Armed Police
(PAP). The county-level People's Armed Departments were
incorporated into civilian establishments.
Establishing a new national defense system of combining
standing forces with reserve forces. The newly organized reserveduty divisions and regiments were conferred with relevant
designations and army flags, formally lining up into the
establishment of PLA. A new system for reserve-duty officers was
also instituted, and efforts were made to bolster the defense
reserve strength. The national mobilization regulations,
statutes, and system were newly enacted and improved, aiming at
combining a crack standing force with a powerful reserve force.
Emphasis on education and training. It was ruled that
education and training should be regarded as the centerpiece for
the daily work of field troops. A training system categorized
into high, medium, and rudimentary levels and two long-term and
short-term training forms were put into force for commanders so
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as to qualify them for their posts in terms of political theory,
knowledge of science, and battle preparing and commanding
capability.
After the strategic readjustment of China's defense policy
was made, the PLA has also converted great quantities of its
military facilities for civilian use or for dual purposes. The
Air Force and the Navy have provided large numbers of airfields
and docks for civilian use. The army has opened more than 300
special-purpose military railroads to society and has provided
257 military long-distance telephone lines to government
institutions. The defense-related industrial departments have
also converted on a large scale to manufacturing civilian
products and have played their roles in economic development.
China's Security Environment and Defense Policy in the Post-Cold
War Era.
1990s. During the post-Cold War era, China has even more
firmly pursued its strategic change of the mid-1980s and has
continued pursuing a defense policy and military strategy for
peace. China now enjoys the best security environment since the
founding of the PRC. China will devote every effort to maintain
the peace and the stability in Asia-Pacific region in order to
develop its economy.
After the strategic readjustment of China's defense policy
of the mid-1980s, profound global changes have taken place. The
Soviet Union is no more. The Cold War has ended. The world
bipolar structure has collapsed, evolving rapidly towards
multipolarity. However, as the new balance in the international
area is short of formation, the transitional period may run
through the whole of the 1990s or even longer, which, on its own,
is likely to complicate further the world situation due to its
overextended duration. On one hand, the Cold War pattern leaves
behind strong imprints and interactions. On the other hand, the
multipolarization and unbalanced development of world economic,
political, and military forces bring forth a series of new
problems, giving rise to a number of new characteristics in the
present world strategic situation. This phenomenon not only
offers historic opportunity to China, which is now fully absorbed
in economic development, but also entails stern challenges. Yet,
by and large, opportunities outnumber challenges.
First, the world strategic situation continues to be more
relaxed, and the possibility of a global war can be basically
ruled out. This is due to the interaction of various sources:
• The major powers have for the first time since the end of
World War II done away with the relationship of direct imminent
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military antagonism. Both the United States and the Soviet Union,
two pillars bolstering two blocks of the East and West which were
on antagonistic terms for almost 45 years, were reduced to
decline for the one and disintegration for the other. Russia, the
main successor of the former Soviet Union, has, from the Chinese
perspective, adopted a pro-West foreign policy. It can be argued
that U.S. power has declined in the wake of the Gulf War.
• One after another, the major powers have adjusted their
military strategies, aiming now at fighting regional conflicts or
local wars rather than large-scale wars as they did in the past.
In March 1992, the United States formally proposed its regional
defense strategy, the centerpiece of which was to shift its focus
of defense from the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to
regional crises and middle-to-low intensity conflicts. Russia,
for its part, emphasized in its new military strategic conception
preparation for local wars or armed conflicts with modern conventional weapons. In addition, countries like Great Britain,
France, and Japan all set their focus of war strategy upon
preparation for regional conflicts.
• Breakthroughs have been made in negotiations on arms
control and disarmament. In the field of nuclear disarmament,
START II was signed by the presidents of the United States and
Russia in January 1993, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
was indefinitely extended in 1995. Regarding conventional disarmament, an agreement on the reduction of conventional weapons
in Europe was signed by 29 countries of NATO, the former Soviet
Union, and East Europe in June 1992. To echo these actions, many
countries unilaterally put into force their disarmament plans.
• The growing integration of the world economy constrains
the outbreak of world war. The growing interchanges,
interactions, and intimacy of the world economy have fostered a
competitive community which interweaves the interests of
different countries.
Second, China has shaken off the direct and imminent
military posture of the superpowers so that it now is not
confronted with the realistic threat of a large-scale attack.
After many years of devoted efforts, China also has established
normal and friendly relations with all its peripheral neighboring
countries. China's relations with Japan are sound and stable, and
it is China's hope that the two countries will go on maintaining
good relations for generations. China has resumed its normal
relations with Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Mongolia, and has
extended exchanges and cooperation with them. Sino-Indian
relations have been improved. China's traditional and friendly
relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Pakistan, and Nepal have been further developed. It has
established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea and
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the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States and has
resumed diplomatic relations with Indonesia, resulting in many
friendly exchanges between China and these countries. Good
progress has also been made in China's relations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Generally speaking, China
has made relatively large achievements in its policy of good
neighborliness.
Third, the world situation continues to be more relaxed, and
China has been enjoying the best period in its peripheral
security environment since the founding of the Republic. However,
the world today is in a period of change in strategic structure.
The international situation is complicated and volatile, and
there are many uncertainties. Hegemony and power politics still
exist, and some western powers still intervene and meddle in
China's internal affairs--even on issues concerning China's
fundamental interests. So China should provide against danger
while living in peace; a country cannot do without defense.
Defense modernization is not to be overlooked and should be
correspondingly developed step-by-step on the basis of economic
development (so as to guard against any change in the future
security situation).
In the new historical period after the Cold War, China's
defense policy and armed force development have the following
characteristics:
(1) Defense modernization must be subjected to and serve the
nation's general strategy of making economic development the
central task, and developing the country into a rich, democratic,
civilized, and modern socialist country through the three-stage
modernization process which was decided in 1978. By now, the
Chinese people have completed the first stage (to double the GNP
of 1980 by 1990) ahead of time, and the 1990s will be a critical
period for China to realize the second stage (redoubling the GNP
of 1990 by the end of this century). Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese
senior leader, pointed out on many occasions that China will not
alter within 100 years, insisting on the economic drive as the
central task of the whole nation. Jiang Zemin, the President of
China, emphasized in his Political Report for the 14th Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party that the most important thing for
adhering to the Party's basic line is to insist on taking the
economic drive as the center, and that "this center cannot be
shaken in any case unless the enemy launches a large-scale
invasion against us." The defense policy has to be subjected to
and serve the party's basic line and strategy of national
economic development. To "be subjected" means that the national
defense development has to be in a less important and subordinate
position, proper size and speed have to be kept for the
development of national defense, and it cannot spend more funds
and national resources and must not harm the general interest of
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national economic development. To "serve" means that it must
provide the security support for the country's economic
development. Additionally, departments of defense, science and
technology, and the defense industry must actively make
contributions to national economic development by pursuing
principles of peace-war combination and civilian military
compatibility.
(2) China's defense policy is purely self-defensive in
nature and is not directed at any specific country. The peaceful
settlement of international disputes and refraining from the use
of force or the threat of using force constitute the basic
principles of China's foreign policy with regard to conflict
resolution. In recent years China has established normal and
amicable relations with all its neighboring countries. China has
already solved long-standing border disputes with some countries
through peaceful negotiation and is in the process of settling
further border problems with other countries. China and India
took steps to reach agreement on some confidence-building
measures and to reduce tension along their border in 1993. China
and Russia initialed an accord on settling boundary disputes and
agreed to stop targeting their nuclear weapons at one another in
1994. China and Vietnam created a commission to settle their
territorial disputes, including territorial waters. With regard
to the Spratly Islands issue, China has put forward the principle
of "shelving the disputes and conducting joint development."
China's positive attitudes are beneficial to avoiding new
conflicts in the region and to solving the problem through
peaceful means, winning appreciation from various quarters. This
is not a tactical move, but China's long-term national strategic
policy.
(3) The sole aim of China's defense policy is to maintain
sovereignty and territorial integrity, while ensuring a stable
security environment for domestic development. China's military
strategy of "active defense" is based on guiding a territorial
defensive operation. In effect, the fighting task of the PLA is
to counter and eventually win a military conflict or a local war
within the border area in case of foreign invasion. China will
not invade other countries forever and will not provoke a war.
But China will not absolutely allow other countries to violate
its own territorial integrity and sovereignty. "We will not
attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will
certainly counterattack." Once the enemy launches an aggressive
war, the Chinese people and army will be bound to rise in selfdefense, and will take effective and flexible operational forms
for fighting against the invaders until the war is won, thus
resuming and rebuilding peace.
(4) China does not prepare to establish any force-projection
capability overseas, does not join in any military alliance, and
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does not seek spheres of influence; these are important
distinguishing qualitites of China's armed forces development and
defense policy. China has no military bases overseas or any
active-duty soldiers stationed abroad. China is not interested in
being involved in an arms race with other powers and will never
engage in military expansion. China has never sought hegemony in
the past, does not at present, and will not in the future.
(5) The overall modernization objective of the PLA is to
develop the army into one that is leaner, better equipped and
better trained, with the capability to win a local war under
modern fighting conditions. In this respect, Jiang Zemin, Central
Secretary of the CPC and Chairman of Central Military Commission,
pointed out at the 14th Party's Congress that:
In the light of Deng Xiaoping's ideas on the armybuilding in the new period, we must develop the
People's Liberation Army into a powerful, modern, and
regularized revolutionary army, and enhance our
strength of national defense, thus providing our
reforms, opening to the outside world an economic drive
with strong security support. The PLA must take the
modernization drive as the center, attach high
importance to its qualitative developing and strengthen
its combat power comprehensively so as to meet the need
of modern warfare and better shoulder the sacred task
of safeguarding state sovereignty of our land, air, and
sea territories and maritime right, and tasks of
maintaining reunification and security of our
motherland.
And
the PLA must surely attach strategic importance to its
education and training, so as to raise the quality of
all officers and soldiers comprehensively and help the
army strive for qualified political consciousness,
perfect mastery of military skill, fine style of
working and fighting, strict disciplines, and powerful
logistic support. And it also should attach great
importance to researches of defense science and
technology and to development of defense industry, thus
gradually improving its weapons and equipment.
So we can see from Jiang Zemin's speech that upgrading weapons,
equipment, and military technology, and improving the quality of
army personnel while developing military thought and doctrine are
the main tasks of China's armed forces modernization.
(6) China's defense modernization will be a gradual and
long-term process due to the limitation of China's defense
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expenditure. In recent years, there have been many discussions
over the level of China's defense expenditure. Although in recent
years China's military spending has increased to some extent, the
increase was partly used to offset the debts accumulated in
previous years because of unduly low military spending. It also
compensated for the loss of spending power caused by high
inflation. For example, China's defense expenditure was 63
billion yuan which was equivalent to US$7.4 billion in 1995.
While defense expenditures increased by 14 percent over the
spending in 1994, the increase was actually zero due to a 15
percent inflation rate for this period. In terms of GNP, China's
defense expenditure is declining in proportion to GNP, from 5.56
percent of GNP in 1979 to 1.2 percent in 1995. At the same time,
China's defense expenditure is also declining in proportion to
the overall government expenditure from 17.4 percent in 1979 to 8
percent in 1995. These figures fully illustrate that China's
defense spending is at a very low level with respect to GNP and
overall expenditures.
China's arms sales have also aroused suspicions. The fact is
that (1) China's arms exports are very limited, and (2) the
Chinese departments which manufacture weapons belong to the State
Council, so the income of arms sales is at the government's
disposal. In late 1979, China's Defense Industry, which includes
nuclear, electronics, shipbuilding, aviation, aerospace, and
weaponry manufacturing, began its first step toward
demilitarizing. During the past decade, China's defense industry
has switched from a formerly military-oriented monorail to its
current dual track system of serving both civil and military
production, and the products for civil use have increased 20
percent every year. At present, more than 70 percent of the
output value of the defense enterprises are civil products. Twothirds of defense enterprises now produce purely civilian
products. What some have said about income from arms sales and
military-produced civil products being used for military spending
is totally wrong.
(7) China's defense modernization is mainly based on its own
efforts of self-reliance. China is a developing country with a
large territory and population. The PLA's weapons and equipment
are of low quality. China cannot build up its national defense by
relying on purchasing new weapons abroad. It is true that China
has purchased 26 SU-27 long-range fighters and 5 SA-10 Grumble
anti-missile systems for the Air Force, and a few new submarines
for the Navy. However, this is relatively modest when compared to
the 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000s bought by Taiwan, and the 160
F-15s purchased by Japan. The argument that "China has imported
large quantities of foreign weaponry and equipment" is much
exaggerated. To improve weapons and equipment, the PLA will
depend mainly on constantly rising levels of research and
development, along with manufacturing technology of industry.
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Such improvement can only be carried out gradually with the
growth of national economic power, while the introduction of
advanced technology and new equipment is limited in scale and is
only supplementary.
(8) China has actively participated in international arms
control and disarmament negotiations. Since the 1980s, China has
signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). China also has committed itself to implementing the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and participated in the
U.N. Arms Transfer Register. China has taken a serious and
conscientious attitude in the U.N. Security Council, has
supported peacekeeping operations, which uphold and preserve
justice, and shows respect for the Charter of the United Nations
as well as international law. It has also dispatched officers to
serve as U.N. military observers.
China will firmly and unswervingly implement the national
general strategy of making economic development the overriding
task, and will adhere to seeking a peaceful and stable external
environment. China's defense policy will also adhere to this
general strategic orientation. China has made and will continue
to make a big contribution to the peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region and to the world at large.
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